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EXPOSING SECRET EVIDENCE: ELIMINATING A NEW
HARDSHIP OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION POLICY
D. Mark Jackson'
We must plan for freedom, and not only for security,
if for no other reason than that only freedom can
make security secure.'
I. INTRODUCTION
United States immigration law reflects a national duality.
On the one hand, America prides itself on being a nation of
immigrants, committed to accepting the world's downtrodden with
a promise of a better life. On the other hand, prejudice and fear
pervade; America is suspicious of outsiders, and acts quickly to
neutralize its perceived foreign threats. Partially embracing each
view, the United States has handed millions of immigrants the
privilege of residence, but has yielded a swift and heavy fist for
those determined undeserving.
Immigration policy often reflects the national mood.3 The
anti-Chinese laws enacted during the nineteenth century reflected a
common national view that the Chinese were "a different race...
who will not assimilate with us."4 Similarly, the World Trade
Center and Oklahoma City bombings, together with a "resurgence
of anti-immigrant sentiment" 5 led to passage of immigration
I J.D. candidate at the College of William and Mary School of Law. I
would like to thank Kit Gage, Kamal Nawash, and Bill Strausberger for their
contributions to this work. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Linda A.
Malone and Alex Linn for their many helpful comments.
2 K.R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 194 (vol. 2 1963).
3 See Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and
Secret Deportation Proceedings, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 23, 24 (1996).
4 Id. (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893)
(Brewer, J., dissenting)).
5 Id. at23.
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legislation directed at Arab Muslims6 and other groups perceived to
be threats to national security.
7
The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) made sweeping changes to the
procedural rights of immigrants.8 Among the most dramatic of the
changes, the new laws authorize the use of "secret evidence"; that is
classified evidence that cannot be revealed in public proceedings
under the rationale of national security. These "secret evidence"
provisions run counter to the basic constitutional guarantees
afforded to aliens by the United States Constitution.
Part II illustrates the recent use of secret evidence against
aliens facing deportation. Part III discusses how the constitutional
argues that the use of secret evidence in immigration proceedings is
rights of aliens have developed and have recently devolved. Part IV
unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the
United States Constitution. Part V concludes that the United States
should abolish its use of secret evidence in deportation proceedings
and offers suggestions for reform.
6 See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Hearings Planned
on Secret Evidence Repeal Act (last modified Nov. 2, 1999)
<http://www.adc.org/action/1999/2nov99.htm>.
7 "[T]he Oklahoma City bombing and earlier bombing of the World Trade
Center demonstrate clearly that the United States must respond seriously to those,
whether foreign or domestic, who kill and seek to make their point through
killings and mass killings of Americans." 141 CONG. REC. S7484 (daily ed. May
25, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Biden).
8 See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132 (April 24, 1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105)
and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRAIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., 110 Stat. 3009 (amended the INA
and re-designated the section to be set out as 8 U.S.C. § 1227).
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II. USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE
The United States has used secret evidence against alien
defendants for over forty years.9 Only recently, however, has the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) begun to use secret
evidence systematically, as part of its standard procedures.
Currently, the Department of Justice introduces claims using
classified information in about twenty cases each year.'0 However,
thirty aliens were removed using the terrorist provisions in 1996,
while twenty were removed in 1997." At this point, twenty-four
aliens are being held by the government based on claims by
anonymous sources. 2 Most of the crucial evidence in these cases
has been kept secret under the rationale that it poses a threat to
national security. Unfortunately, many law abiding individuals
have fallen victim to these procedures.
Nasser Ahmed13 legally immigrated from Egypt to New
York City in 1986, where he lived with his wife and three children
while working as an electrical engineer. He was a respected
member of his community, and during the summer helped run a
large summer school. Beginning April 23, 1999, he entered his
9 See The Use of Classified Evidence in Immigration Proceedings:
Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and
Government of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (Oct. 8, 1998)
(testimony of Paul W. Virtue, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Department of Justice).
10 See id.
I I See Hearing on H.R. 1745 Before the House Judiciary Committee, 106th
Cong., (May 18, 1999) (testimony of Michael Wildes).
12 John F. Sugg, Secret Evidence, 32 THE LINK 1, 2 (1999) (Americans for
Middle East Understanding, New York, N.Y.).
13 For a general factual discussion of Ahmed's case see JAMES X. DEMPSEY
& DAVID COLE, TERRORISM & THE CONSTITUTION, 128-31 (1999); Kit Gage,
Other Secret Evidence Cases, 32 THE LINK 8, 10-11 (1999) (Americans for
Middle East Understanding, New York, N.Y.).
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fourth year of solitary confinement in an unheated jail cell in New
York City.
Ahmed regularly attended a mosque, which was under
surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) because
some of its members were politically opposed to the government of
Egypt. 4 Their political opposition was based on reports by human
rights organizations that Egypt engages in human rights abuses,
including torture and indefinite detention. Ahmed came under
further scrutiny when working as a court appointed paralegal and
translator for the defense team of a defendant accused of conspiring
to plant bombs in New York City. During this case, the INS and the
FBI attempted to convince Ahmed to become an informant. When
Ahmed declined the offer, the INS threatened to deport Ahmed and
his family. On April 24, 1995, the INS arrested Ahmed for
overstaying his visa. Ahmed was released on bond for one year but
was rearrested on the basis of secret evidence. Ahmed was denied
bail and remained in solitary confinement.
When arrested, he was not charged with a crime, nor did the
government allege that he was in any way involved in illegal
activity. Nevertheless, the INS accused Ahmed of being a "threat to
national security,""5 and detained him based on secret evidence that
neither he nor his lawyers could examine. Specifically, Ahmed
received a one sentence summary stating that the government had
evidence "concerning respondent's association with a known [but
unidentified] terrorist organization."' 6 The immigration judge in
this case admitted that the summary was "largely useless."' 7 Since
this proceeding, the government has gradually revealed some of the
evidence against Ahmed. At most, the evidence accused Ahmed of
associating with members of a non-violent political organization.
Nevertheless, the evidence does not charge that "Ahmed himself
had ever engaged in any illegal activity or supported any illegal
14 See id.
1.5 DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 13, at 129.
16 Id.
17 Gage, supra note 13, at 10.
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activity."' 8 Furthermore, most of the evidence "is double or triple
hearsay."'
1 9
Recently, the immigrationjudge who heard this case ordered
Ahmed's release. The INS Commissioner filed an appeal with
Attorney General Janet Reno that Ahmed be detained pending her
final approval, citing "national security concerns. 20 As Reno's
deadline for a decision approached, the INS withdrew its request.
After three and one-half years of solitary confinement --separated
from his wife, family, work, and community--Ahmed was released.
Hany Kiareldeen2' immigrated from the Gaza Strip to the
United States in 1990. He is married to a United States citizen and
has a four year-old child. Kiareldeen was separated from his family
for nineteen months based on secret evidence.
In March of 1998, Kiareldeen and his brother were
threatened by four INS agents that they would be "taught a lesson."
22
The INS charged Kiareldeen with overstaying his student visa. He
was detained without bond solely on the basis of secret evidence.
His unclassified summary of the evidence stated that he was a
"suspected member of a terrorist organization," he had "associated"
with a person connected to the World Trade Center bombing, and
that he had threatened Attorney General Janet Reno.23 His defense
team believed, and it was implied by one district court judge, that
the allegations originated from his embittered ex-wife.24 She had
been previously responsible for domestic and child abuse charges
that were found by the government to be false. During Kiareldeen's
is DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 13, at 130.
19 Free Nasser Ahmed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at A26.
20 Reno Still Mulling Egyptian's Release, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1999, at
A7.
21 For a general factual discussion of Kiareldeen's case, see Gage, supra
note 13, at 12.
22 Id. at 12.
2.3 Id.
24 See Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (1999); Gage, supra note 13,
at 12. See also, John Kifher, F.B.L Says Man is Terrorist but Family Sees Plot by
Ex-Wife, N.Y.TIMES, June 27, 1998 at B1.
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deportation hearing, the government refused to allow his ex-wife to
be cross-examined, claiming the privilege of national security.
One immigration judge called the evidence against
Kiareldeen "meager."2 In fact, every immigration judge who heard
Kiareldeen's case ordered him to be released. With each victory,
however, the INS appealed. The INS considered the
unsubstantiated evidence sufficient to detain Kiareldeen.
Fortunately, Kiareldeen was granted a Habeas Corpus review of the
constitutionality of his detention. Federal District Judge William H.
Walls was the first judiciary to declare the use of secret evidence
unconstitutional, declaring that Kiareldeen's due process rights had
been violated.26 The Department of Justice decided not to appeal
again, claiming that "the process ha[d] taken its course." 27
Kiareldeen was able to return to his family after a year and a half in
a New Jersey prison.
As courts have become more suspicious of the use of secret
evidence, the INS has sought to avoid a definitive ruling on the
matter.2 In this way, the INS has been willing to concede negative
rulings on individual secret evidence cases in order to continue to
engage in the practice on a larger scale.29 Commentators have
described this strategy as a "face-saving measure" since it allows
them to avoid "bad decisions on the record" from the Attorney
25 Andy Newman, Immigrant Freed after Being Held for 19 Months h
Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1999, at B1.
26 Nat Hentoff, Prosecution in Darkness, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1999, at
A25.
27 Statement by the Justice Department on the Case Against Hany
Kiareldeen, United States Department of Justice Press Release, Oct. 26, 1999.
One INS spokesman believes that Kiareldeen presented so much evidence that it
was eventually powerful enough to override the government's confidential claims.
For example, he was able to provide an alibi for the times he would have had to
have been with the alleged co-conspirator. Telephone Interview with Bill
Strausberger, Public Affairs Officer, Immigration and Naturalization Service
(Nov. 22, 1999).




General or higher courts.3" Secret evidence, therefore, continues to
be used routinely by the INS, and remains mostly unchallenged as
a general practice.
III. THE RISE AND FALL OF ALIEN RIGHTS
A. Legislative and Judicial Roles in Immigration
The United States Constitution grants Congress the
authority to regulate immigration. Article I enumerates that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power ... To establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization[.]"'" With this power, "Congress plays a central role
in defining the processes through which citizenship is judged, and in
fixing the consequences citizenship or non-citizenship entail."32
Paramount in this power is Congress's ability to exclude
nonresident aliens in the manner it determines.33 The rationale is to
preserve delicate foreign policy matters to the political branches.34
It is well recognized that "[o]ver no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the
admission of aliens."35
30J Lorraine Adams & David A. Vise, INS Drops Pleas to Reno to Detain
Egyptian, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1999, at A5.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
.32 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 277 (1978).
33 See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953) ("Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a
fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political
departments largely immune from judicial control.").
14 See William C.B. Underwood, Note, Unreviewable Discretionary
Justice: The New Extreme Hardship in Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72
IND. L.J. 888, 907 (1997) ("Taken to its extreme, the doctrine lends itself as an
intellectual justification for courts to turn a blind eye toward potential abuses and
agency excesses.").
15 Sara A. Martin, Note, Postcards from the Border: A Result-Oriented
Analysis of Immigration Reform Under the AEDPA and JIRIRA, 19 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 683, 696 (1999).
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As with many of its powers, however, Congress has
delegated its authority over immigration. 36 Pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Congress delegates its
powers involving immigration to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). The INS is a federal administrative
agency governed by the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).
Administered by the executive branch, the INS is part of the
Department of Justice and is ultimately accountable to the Attorney
General.
Despite the broad powers granted to the INS, the judiciary
may determine the constitutionality of immigration laws. To
achieve this control, the Court gradually has developed judicial
review of immigration matters. Initially, review of INS decisions
was completed by internal by the executive branch rather than the
judicial branch. The INA declares that "[t]he decision of the
Attorney General shall be final."37 The judiciary first began carving
out its role in Heikkila v. Barber.38 The Court held that the INA
precludes judicial review except as required by the Constitution."
However, final review was soon modified to mean final
"administrative procedure rather than cutting off the right ofjudicial
review in whole or in part."4
There was no statutory authorization of judicial review for
immigration decisions until 1961, even though it was mentioned in
the INA of 1952. In 1961, amendments to the INA provided for
judicial review. The INA provided that exclusive review of final
deportation orders may be filed in the United States Court of
Appeals where the litigant resides or where the proceedings are
conducted. In McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr.,41 the Court held that
36 See generally, CHARLEs GORDON, ET AL, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE (1999).
37 INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (1982).
38 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
39 See id. at 234-35.
40 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 50 (1955).
41 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 448 U.S. 479 (1991).
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the judiciary must interpret statutes to favor judicial review.42 This
lit the "green light for . . . questioning the legality and
constitutionality of administrative determinations and
procedures."' 3 Additionally, the Court has allowed judicial review
under the doctrine of Habeas Corpus. Habeas Corpus is the ancient
common law writ used to test illegal detention--it is required by the
Constitution, and may not be suspended except in cases of rebellion
or invasion.'
While a developed jurisprudence supports the judiciary's
power to review the constitutionality of INS procedures, the ability
of the judiciary to carry out this function has been severely
weakened by recent legislation."a For example, aliens deported
because of their commission of a past crime may find it very
difficult to argue a constitutional claim. First, INS judges cannot
review the constitutionality of the statute under which they
42 See id. (examining a 1986 statute which precluded judicial review of
INS determinations except'in a petition to review a subsequent deportation order).
43 GORDON ET AL, supra note 36, at § 104.01[2].
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, §9 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.").
45 Some of the new procedures radically change the shape of judicial
review:
Exclusive jurisdiction provision: Except as provided in this
section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or
on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by
the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this
chapter.
INA § 242(g), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1996).
There is a rich body of scholarly work on the constitutionality of the
new judicial review proceedings. For a thorough analysis of this topic see Lenni
B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of
Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1411 (1997).
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adjudicate.46 Second, an alien usually may not appeal until a final
order has been rendered by the INS. An alien cannot generally go to
court to challenge constitutionality unless the litigant can show
irreparable harm.47 Third, a newly enacted provision in the AEDPA
bars federal court review of final deportation orders based on
criminal convictions.48 The statute states that "[a]ny final order of
deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of having
committed a criminal offense covered in various sections of the INA
shall not be subject to review by any court. '4 9 The circuits are split
as to whether this bars even habeas review by the federal courts.5°
A difficult process is thus made worse since the use of secret
evidence makes deportation hearings "mere formalities and the final
orders of such hearings cannot be appealed or reviewed."'" Despite
these difficulties, many aliens have found their way to federal courts
where they may challenge the constitutionality of secret evidence.
B. INS Authority to Use Secret Evidence
Although its use has become more pervasive, secret
evidence has been sanctioned in part by the federal courts and the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dating back over four
decades.52 In Knauff v. Shaughnessy" and Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex
46 See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 13, at 200 n.2.
47 See Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947).
48 Carol Leslie Wolchok, Demands and Anxiety: The Effects of the New
Immigration Law, 24 HUM. RTS. 12, 12 (1997).
49 AEDPA §440(a), amending 8 U.S.C. § 1105 Pub. L. No. 104-32 (April
24, 1996).
501 Compare Hose v. INS, 141 F.3d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying
habeas jurisdiction), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 161 F.3d 1225 (1988),
Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338 (lth Cir. 1998) (denying habeas
jurisdiction), and Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997) (denying
habeas jurisdiction), with Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(upholding elimination of statutory revocation but preserving constitutional
habeas jurisdiction).
.51 Martin, supra note 35, at 689.
52 See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
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rel. Mezei,5 4 the INS detained aliens that were entering the country.
The INS then used secret evidence to continue their detention. In
U.S. ex rel. Barbour 'v. District Director of Immigration and
Naturalization Service, San Antonio Texas,s5 an alien was denied an
application for discretionary bail based on evidence submitted ex
parte by the State Department to the INS. In Jay v. Boyd,5 6 the
Court considered a habeas petition brought by a resident alien
whose application for suspension of deportation had been denied by
the INS. The Court found that the INS had properly followed a
regulation that allowed it to submit evidence secretly if the
information would be "prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or
security.
' 957
In 1996, at a peak in anti-immigrant sentiment, the 104th
Congress passed legislation that radically affected the rights of
aliens."s The legislation was based on a growing fear of domestic
terrorism." Indeed, it was the recent terrorist events that provided
the political momentum to pass the legislation. 6' Despite heavy
criticism from immigration advocates, what "finally boosted the
evidence over the top was the bombing of the federal building[.],
61
However, in a rush to protect United States' security, Congress
passed provisions of tenuous constitutionality.62
Shaghnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392
(2d Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Antonio, Texas, 491 F.2d 573 (5th
Cir. 1974).
53 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
".A 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
s.. 491 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1974).
.56 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
.57 Id.
59 Floor debate frequently invoked the recent terrorist attacks in arguing for
passage of the legislation. See e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. H3605, H3608 (1996).
.9 See id.
60 See id.
61 Sugg, supra note 12, at 2.
62 Many of the Bill's key provisions were hotly contested in floor debates.
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Nevertheless, carried by a Republican majority, most of
these provisions became law. The AEDPA and IIRAIRA amended
the INA to provide for many controversial new changes. For
example, the law bars re-entry for overstaying visas except in
"exceptional circumstances." 63 A new summary exclusion
procedure provides that a criminal can be retroactively deported for
any crime of moral turpitude, including shoplifting. T4 The new
legislation has had a startling effect on the number of deportations.
Almost 112,000 immigrants were deported in 1997, compared to
approximately 69,000 in 1996.65
Among the most controversial of the new enactments were
the provisions providing for the use of secret evidence; that is,
classified information that the government will not reveal.16 For
example, one section provides for a special procedure for aliens
suspected of being terrorists and bars them from seeking important
forms of relief from deportation. The proceeding is administered by
a panel of federal judges. During the proceeding, aliens are barred
from applying for any mandatory relief, such as asylum or waiver of
deportation, even if it is evident that the alien will be persecuted
upon returning to his original country. Further, the alien has no right
See e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. H3605, H3608 (1996) (remarks of Rep. Hyde) (arguing
that the AEDPA does not violate the Sixth Amendment).
63 Wolchok, supra note 48, at 12; IIRAIRA § 632, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (1996).
64 See Wolchok, supra note 48, at 12; IIRAIRA § 604, 8 U.S.C. § 1227
(1996).
65 See Martin, supra note 35, at 691. This problem is compounded by the
rising numbers of immigrants seeking asylum, increasing by seventy-five percent
between 1996 and 1998. Most of these detainees are forced to wait for their
hearing in jail. See, Amnesty International News Release, Selected Statistics on
Human Rights Violations in the USA (Oct. 6, 1998),
<http://www.amnesty.org/news/1998/25106398.htm.>.
66 "Classified information is any information or material that has been
determined by the United States' government pursuant to Executive Order,
statute, or regulation, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for
reasons of national security." Memorandum from the Office of the Chief
Immigration Judge to Immigration Judges, Judicial Law Clerks, Court
Administrators, and Court Staff (July 21, 1999) (on file with author). See also,
Exec. Order No. 12,958 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 §1.1(c) (1995).
Exposing Secret Evidence
to suppress unconstitutionally or illegally obtained evidence. These
proceedings are labeled "Alien Terrorist Special Removal
Proceedings."6 7 The statute states that:
The judge shall examine, exparte and in camera, any
evidence for which the Attorney General determines
that the public disclosure would pose a risk to the
national security of the United States or to the
security of any individual because it would disclose
classified information and neither the alien nor the
public shall be informed of such evidence or its
sources other than through reference to the summary
provided pursuant to this paragraph and, in the case
of classified information, after coordination with the
originating agency, elect to introduce such evidence
in open session.68
The procedure requires that a summary of the evidence be
provided that is "sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a
defense."69 In practice, however, this may be no more than a short
sentence indicating that the government possesses the evidence,
without any description of its substance or source.7 ° Moreover,
summary can be waived if:
the continued presence of the alien in the United
States would likely cause serious and irreparable
harm to the national security or death or serious
bodily injury to any person, and.., the provision of
67 See 8 U.S.C. § 1531(1996).
68 INA S504(d)(3)(A) (amended by Sec. 354 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. S1534(e)(3)(A) (Supp. 1997)).
69 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(1996). Compare with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act which provides the defendant with the ability to suppress
evidence if it was illegally obtained.
70 See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 13, at 125.
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the summary would likely cause serious and
irreparable harm to the national security or death or
serious bodily injury to any person.7'
The statute specifically defines an "alien terrorist" group as
including people who have merely supported a terrorist
organization's lawful activities, including humanitarian or political
work.72 The INS, however, can interpret this definition broadly.
For example, the statute can be invoked when the INS determines
that disclosure of the evidence would "pose a risk to the national
71 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(1996).
72 Id. Compare with the State Department's definition of foreign terrorist
organizations. To "engage in terrorist activity... [means] to commit an act of
terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably should know,
affords material support to any individual, organization, or government in
conducting a terrorist activity." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). The State
Department designates the following groups as foreign terrorist organizations:
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Armed Islamic
Group (GIA), Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) , Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA),
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Hawatmeh Faction (DFLP),
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement), Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA), Hizballah
(Party of God), Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group (IG)), Japanese Red Army
(JRA), al-Jihad, Kach, Kahane Chai, Khmer Rouge, Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic
Front Dissidents (FPMR/D), Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK, MKO),
National Liberation Army (ELN), Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ),
Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction (PLF), Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November),
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), Revolutionary
People's Struggle (ELA), Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL), Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). See United States State Department,
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/terrorist-orgs list.html>.
However, the government's classification of terrorist groups has been
notoriously inaccurate. For example, declassified information has revealed that
the FBI once misidentified the Dutch airline KLM as a terrorist organization.
See American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Hearings Planned on
Secret Evidence Repeal Act (last modified Nov. 2, 1999)
<http://www.adc.org/action/1999/2nov99.htm>.
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security of the United States or to the security of any person."'73 In
effect, this allows the government to make this claim whenever
evidence is classified or has been able to get its evidence classified
prior to the proceeding.74
The new procedure radically changes the rights of aliens. It
allows for even harsher treatment of aliens suspected of having
disfavorable associations. Constitutional scholars James Dempsey
and David Cole summarize the detention process as:
[I]mmediate detention without bail of all aliens
subject to this procedure. Noncitizens here on
student visas, tourist visas, or special labor visas are
denied any hearing whatsoever regarding their
detention. Lawful permanent resident aliens are
entitled to a hearing, but the government is able to
use classified information, and instead of the
government having to prove that there are grounds
for detention the alien bears the burden of proving
that there is no basis for detention."
The INS has not specifically invoked the "alien terrorist"
designation. Some scholars have argued that the INS has avoided
this procedure because it provides certain advantages to some
aliens. 76 First, the procedure requires that the alien be given a
summary of the evidence, despite the broad rule for waiver. Second,
the panel is comprised of federal judges who may rule directly on
the constitutionality of the statute. Since INS judges lack
constitutional jurisdiction, aliens might be unable to voice a
constitutional claim quickly, thus circumventing the review process
that takes years. Third, the INS attempts to deport those who do not
fit within the already expansive definition of "terrorist activity."
73 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(1996).
74 DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 13, at 125.
7.5 Id.
76 See id. at 200-01 n.2.
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Specifically, the INS is trying to include "mere membership and/or
fundraising for peaceful activities."77
Despite specifically avoiding this procedure, the INS
regularly uses secret evidence. First, secret evidence is used in
summary deportations of arriving aliens. Second, secret evidence is
used in regular deportation hearings against aliens seeking
discretionary relief. Third, secret evidence is used in proceedings
where it is not allowed by statute.
First, secret evidence is used to oppose admission of arriving
aliens.78 This includes any non-citizen who is arriving at a border.
In reviewing the entrance of an arriving alien, the Attorney General
may use "confidential information that the alien is inadmissible...
and ... disclosure of the information would be prejudicial to the
public interest, safety, or security[.]"79 This procedure may be
harsh, but it lacks some of the major constitutional problems present
in other provisions. Entering aliens are considered not to be within
the country and, therefore, cannot be considered resident aliens. As
non-resident aliens, these individuals lack constitutional rights.
Second, secret evidence is used against deportable aliens
seeking discretionary relief. For those aliens who have successfully
entered the country (either legally or illegally), they are treated as
resident aliens. Resident aliens can be deported for violating
immigration regulations or certain domestic laws. Those aliens
77 Id.
78 INA $235(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(1982).
79 Id.
Exposing Secret Evidence
facing deportation typically apply for discretionary relief. An alien
applies for discretionary relief when the alien is otherwise
deportable, but has compelling reasons not to be deported. For
example, an alien who overstays his student visa is legally
deportable. However, if the alien has a family or children that are
legal residents or citizens, his deportation will likely be waived.
Secret evidence may be used when deportable aliens seek
discretionary relief. When applying for discretionary relief in a
deportation proceeding:
[T]he alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against the alien, to present
evidence on the alien's own behalf, and to
cross-examine witnesses presented by the
government but these rights shall not entitle the alien
to examine such national security information as the
Government may proffer in opposition to the alien's
admission to the United States or to an application by
the alien for discretionary relief.8"
Following this provision, the INS regulations call for "a reasonable
opportunity to examine and object to evidence against him or her"
except "such national security information as the government may
proffer in opposition[.]"'" The INS has used secret evidence against
many aliens who have fairly sought legitimate and deserving
discretionary relief. Since many aliens are simply unable to put
forth a true defense in light of the strict protocols of secret evidence,
and their ability to rebut or impeach is usually very limited, secret
evidence often means the end for those seeking this privilege.
Third, the INS has utilized secret evidence more broadly
than the statute allows on its face, thus using secret evidence in a
manner more resembling the harsher procedures provided for in the
"alien terrorist" provisions." For example, the INS has used secret
80 INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(4)(B)(Supp. II. (1996)).
81 8 C.F.R. § 240.10 (a)(4)(1998).
82 The federal district court judge in Kiareledeen considered arguments as
2000-2001
BUFFALO PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNALVOL. XIX
evidence in support of deportation itself, rather than limiting its use
to hearings for discretionary relief as the statute requires. 83
Regardless, the INS's use of secret evidence against resident aliens
has violated the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
IV. USING SECRET EVIDENCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The INS's use of secret evidence is unconstitutional in three
ways. First, the use of secret evidence derives from an improper and
inaccurate analysis of congressional powers to regulate
immigration. Second, use of secret evidence violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Third, the use of secret
to whether INS's use of secret evidence in a bond hearing was made ultra vires.
While implying that this argument at least had some merit, the case was decided
on other grounds. If the INS acts outside of its statutory powers, it also raises a
serious separation of powers problem. Since the Anti-Terrorism Act, for the first
time, specifically granted INS statutory authority to use secret evidence, it is
logical that Congress intended for INS to solely follow these statutory procedures.
If Congress had recognized INS's extra-statutory power to use secret evidence it
would have been redundant to provide for such power in the statute. Moreover,
the INS's extra-statutory use of secret evidence is more broad than the use
provided for by statute. Therefore, using secret evidence absent the statutory
procedures may violate congressional intent. As a legislatively created agency,
the executive branch may not operate the INS contrary to congressional intent.
While this argument is not treated in this paper, it may be a viable argument
worthy of additional examination.
83 See, e.g., Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (1999). Secret
evidence has also been used to oppose the legal re-entry of a resident alien. This
practice, however, was declared unconstitutional. See, Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F.
Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that use of secret evidence violates due process
in opposing re-entry as applied to a long-time resident with several children
suspected of being a Palestinian activist).
INS regulations provide for various uses of secret evidence. See, e.g., 8
C.F.R. § 240.11(c)(3)(iv)(1988) (allowing use of classified evidence in
application for asylum and withholding of removal in removal proceedings); 8
C.F.R. § 240.33(c)(4)(1988) (allowing use of classified evidence in applications
for asylum and withholding of deportation in exclusion proceedings); 8 C.F.R. §
240.49(a)(1988) (allowing use of classified evidence in adjustment of status
reports); 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(d)(1988) (allowing use of classified evidence in
custody and bond redetermination).
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evidence violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.
A. Congressional Power Over Immigration Does not Preclude
Alien Constitutional Rights
The INS has justified its use of secret evidence by arguing
that Congress has full and unlimited power to regulate immigration,
and that by extension, aliens are not entitled to the same
constitutional protection afforded to citizens. Furthermore, the INS
argues that case law supports the use of secret evidence in
immigration proceedings. However, this argument errs in two
regards. First, this argument ignores cases holding that resident
aliens are entitled to full constitutional protection. Second, it
misapplies cases upholding the use of secret evidence.
First, resident aliens, or aliens who have entered the United
States, have traditionally been afforded constitutional fights. The
Constitution delineates between rights afforded to citizens and
fights afforded to all persons. The right to vote requires citizenship,
while the right to due process of law is linked solely to the status of
personage. Constitutional rights afforded to persons are afforded to
both citizens and to aliens within United States jurisdiction. The
Court noted that "there is a notion of fundamental human fights that
protects individuals," notwithstanding their alien status. "
Therefore, aliens need only pass through the border to gain and
maintain full constitutional rights not otherwise reserved for
citizens." These rights apply throughout immigration law. For
example, aliens maintain constitutional protections even if they
overstay a visa or otherwise remain illegally.86 Similarly, the Court
84 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
8.5 See Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409 (1999); Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1953) (holding that resident aliens are
afforded Fifth Amendment due process rights, though nonresident aliens are not).
86 See Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409 (1999) (claiming that it
is an "axiomatic, constitutional premise that aliens once legally admitted into the
United States, are entitled to the shelter of the Constitution"). See also, Landon
2000-2001
BUFFALO PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNALVOL. IX
has held that "it is well established that the Fifth Amendment
entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings." 7
Second, the INS misapplies those cases upholding the use of
secret evidence. The cases that the INS uses to justify secret
evidence do not apply to resident aliens. These cases are
distinguishable because the aliens involved have not technically
entered United States jurisdiction. For example, United States ex re.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy denied due process protection to an alien
facing secret evidence in an exclusion proceeding.88 However, this
proceeding blocks the admission of arriving aliens. Aliens facing
this proceeding are denied due process protection because they have
not yet entered United States jurisdiction. Relying only on these
cases for support, however, the INS uses secret evidence against
aliens who have entered the United States. The INS may not
properly rely on these cases to justify use of secret evidence against
resident aliens.8
B. Secret Evidence Violates Due Process
v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("This Court has long held that an alien
seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no
constitutional rights regarding his application... [but having gained admission]
begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional
status changes correspondingly.").
87 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
88 United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
89 The other cases that the INS uses to support its claims can easily be
distinguished as well, but on different grounds. The Court in Jay v. Boyd, 351
U.S. 345 (1956), upheld the INS's use of secret evidence, but it did so only on
statutory grounds, and the providing regulations clearly allowed for it. The Court
did not, however, reach the question of whether secret evidence was
constitutional. The Court in United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Antonio, Texas, 491 F.2d 573
(5th Cir. 1974), upheld the use of secret evidence. This case, however, was
decided before Matthews v. Eldgridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which presently
controls due process jurisprudence. As will be further argued, the use of secret
evidence does not meet the due process requirements set forth in Matthews v.
Eldgridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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The jurisprudence is well settled that resident aliens are
granted certain constitutional rights, among them the right of due
process. The INS's use of secret evidence does not provide
sufficient process when balanced against the state's interest in
national security. For this reason, the INS's use of secret evidence
violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The Fifth
Amendment states that "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]"" The Court has
consistently held that this right is guaranteed to resident aliens.9'
The court in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding et al.9  held that aliens
within U.S. borders are "persons" protected by the Constitution, and
implicitly, the Fifth Amendment.93 In this case, an alien returning
from a merchant trip was excluded without a hearing or even notice
of the "nature and cause of any accusations against him."94 The
Court held that "[a]lthough Congress may prescribe conditions for
his expulsion and deportation, not even Congress may expel him
without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard."95
In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,96 an alien
faced indefinite detention on Ellis Island pending deportation. The
alien had resided in the United States for twenty-five years, and was
returning home from a two year trip abroad. The government
refused to reveal its classified information to the federal judge, even
in camera. The Court rejected that a resident alien at the border was
not guaranteed due process.97 When applied to aliens, "[p]rocedural
safeguards are thus necessary to ensure that the substantive law is
administered fairly-not arbitrarily-with respect to the specific
individual."98 In Matthews v. Diaz,99 the Court plainly stated that:
90 U.S. CONST. amend. 5.
91 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
92 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
9.3 See id. at 595.
94 Id. at 597.
9.5 Id. at 597-98.
96 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
97 See id. at 212.
98 Scaperlanda, supra note 3, at 25. See also, 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS &
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There are literally millions of aliens within the
jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth
Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment,
protects everyone of these persons form deprivation
of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. Even one whose presence in this country is
unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that
constitutional protection.' 00
In determining what due process the government must afford
to an individual the government must follow the Mathews v.
Eldgridge "balancing test."' Specifically, the government must
weigh the private interest affected, considering the risk to the
interest and the value of additional safeguards, against the
government's interest in not providing additional procedure. The
private interest in not facing deportation is high. The use of secret
evidence presents a serious risk to aliens because they are
disallowed a fair hearing. The government interest in national
security, while important, does not outweigh the risk to the private
interest. Therefore, the INS's use of secret evidence does not meet
the balancing test requirements, and thus violates the Due Process
Clause.0 2
The first step of the balancing test is to weigh the private
interest in having more procedure. An alien has a high interest in
not being detained and deported. First, aliens have an interest in
their physical liberty.'0 3 While awaiting deportation, aliens may
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.2 at 9 (1994)
("When... government singles out an individual for adverse action, the political
process provides little protection. Individuals singled out for adverse action can
be protected only by forcing the government to use a decision-making process
that ensures fairness to the individual.").
99 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
100O Id. at 77.
11 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
1102 But see Scaperlanda, supra note 3, at 27-30.
10)3 See Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (1999) (enunciating
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have to spend years in jail where they may face harassment, abuse,
and emotional trauma in being separated from their families. Once
deported, an alien will be isolated from the nation that he has chosen
to call home. Upon returning to their country of origin, aliens may
also face persecution. For many, being forced to return to their
countries may put them at a high risk of death due to their political
and religious beliefs.
Second, aliens have an interest in their families. In many
cases, aliens facing deportation have families that they seek to
maintain, support, and enjoy. This type of family unity has received
constitutional protection when applied in other areas of law.' In
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,' the Court held that a right of a
family to remain together was a fundamental liberty interest
protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."0 6 Similarly, the remaining family has an interest in
the alien not being deported. That is, "[d]eportation also affects
those left behind, often U.S. citizens, by banishing their loved ones,
that physical liberty "must be accorded the utmost weight.").
104 See Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity:
Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of
Plenary Power Versus Aliens'Rights, 41 VILL. L. REv. 725, 763-64 (1996).
105 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
106 See id. at 503 (arguing that the right of a family to live together is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.").
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tearing families apart, and eliminating any economic support the
loved one provided."'
0 7
Third, aliens have an interest in maintaining ties to their
community. This may include friends and neighbors, as well as
connections to specific institutions such as a church or school.
Many aliens facing deportation have lived in the United States for
decades and have developed strong bonds in their communities.
Further, aliens may have developed an identity based on their new
nation. The uprooting and deportation of aliens can strip them of
this identity.
Fourth, aliens have an interest in maintaining their work.
Deportation takes away an alien's livelihood and deprives that
person of the means with which to support themselves and their
families. Aside from this economic value, depriving aliens of their
work takes away a part of their human dignity by taking away their
ability to be productive, self-sufficient, and a provider.
Plainly, aliens have important interests at stake in
immigration proceedings. Aliens have an interest in their physical
liberty, preservation of family unity, maintaining ties in their
community, and continuing their livelihood. For these reasons,
aliens have a high interest in not being detained and deported.
107 Martin, supra note 35, at 687.
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The second step of the balancing test is to consider the risks
involved with allowing secret evidence. The rationale for this step
of the analysis is that "[p]rocedural requirements entail the
expenditure of limited resources, so that at some point the benefit to
individuals from an additional safeguard is substantially outweighed
by the cost of providing such protection."'0° The risks aliens face by
being deported with secret evidence is high.
Aliens who must face secret evidence risk a proceeding
which lacks many of the basic elements of a fair trial. First, when
secret evidence is used against aliens, they are unable to confront
their accusers. Aliens have little ability to defend themselves when
they do not know the charges against them or the source of those
charges. Second, secret evidence disables aliens from explaining
the substance and context of the evidence to the fact finder. A
proper explanation of the meaning and context allows the fact finder
to properly weigh the probative value of that evidence. Third,
secret evidence disallows aliens from cross-examining or otherwise
impeaching witnesses against them. Cross-examination is one of
the most powerful tools used to get to the truth in a case. Lacking
cross-examination, aliens may face biases or inaccurate evidence
without the chance to expose these weaknesses to the fact finder.
One can get a sense for how weak secret evidence usually is
based on specific secret evidence that has been reclassified. For
example, most of the evidence is usually nothing more than charges
of association.0 9 Not only is this lacking in probative value, but it
violates the detainee's First Amendment interests."0 An alien facing
such an accusation in secret cannot expose the constitutional
infirmity of this evidence. Furthermore, the government has an
extremely poor record on convictions involving secret evidence.
108 Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1276
(1975).
109 DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 13, at 150-5 1.
110 This is another objection raised against recent immigrant legislation.
See, e.g., AADC v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (1995). See also, DEMPSEY &
COLE, supra note 13, at 150-5 1.
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The FBI's internal security and terrorism cases that were referred to
federal prosecutors between 1992 and 1996 yielded a conviction
rate of only twenty-two percent.111 Considering this dismal success
rate, along with the fact that "the mere weight of caseloads can make
immigration decision-makers unsympathetic to an alien's plight...
[and] the agency's increasing caseload burden contributes to an
anti-immigrant, pro-enforcement bias,"' 2 it is likely that most secret
evidence is of very poor quality.
In an attempt to define these risks, Judge Friendly has
elucidated the essential qualities of a fair hearing.' Included is the
right "to call witnesses," the right "to know the evidence against
one," the right "to have the decision based only on the evidence
presented," and the right that evidence be presented in a public
proceeding. "4 Using secret evidence makes all of these rights
impossible. Furthermore, the district court held in American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 115 that the disclosure of
evidence against aliens exists at "the core of constitutional due
process," and that the "use of undisclosed information in
adjudications should be presumptively unconstitutional."
' 16
Finally, other changes in immigration policy have
heightened the interest in providing a fair hearing. Previously,
immigration policies allowed broad discretion to provide waivers
and suspensions of deportation."' Utilizing these means, judges
could take into account the interests in family, friends, and
community." 8 Unfortunately, the new immigration legislation has
III See Sugg, supra note 12, at 2.
112 Underwood, supra note 34, at 917. See also, Kevin R. Johnson,
Responding to the "Litigation Explosion ": The Plain Meaning of the Executive
Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 444 (1993).
113 Friendly, supra note 104, at 1279-95. (1975).
114 Id.
s 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. Cal. 1995).
116 Id. at 1070.
117 See INA § 212 (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(1991); INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. §
1254 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
118 See id.; INA § 212 (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(1991); see generally,
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largely eliminated this discretion."9 Thus, aliens have much more
at risk with an unfair hearing now than they had previously.
Therefore, including secret evidence at immigration
proceedings, presents important risks to aliens. Having to contend
with secret evidence allows poor quality evidence to influence
decisions and largely eliminates many of the qualities of a fair
hearing. For these reasons, the risks of using secret evidence are
high.
The third step of the balancing test is to consider the interests
of the government in using secret evidence. The INS bases its use
of secret evidence on the rationale that it is justified by national
security. Concededly, national security is an important government
goal. However, secret evidence is often not important to national
security. Rather, the government is concerned more with the source
of its information than with the substance of its information.
Therefore, the government's interest in using secret evidence is low.
In describing how national security is implicated in secret
evidence cases, William 0. Studeman, Acting Director of
Intelligence explained that in order to combat terrorism, it is:
Underwood, supra note 34 (outlining the erosion of judicial review and
discretionary decisionmaking under the AEDPA and IIRAIRA).
119 See Martin, supra note 35, at 700.
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critical that the United States obtain the close and
continual cooperation of other countries. One of the
best ways to ensure this cooperation is to protect the
information that these countries share with us about
terrorists. Foreign governments simply will not
confide in us if we cannot keep their secrets. One
goal.., is to provide a mechanism to do just that by
protecting classified information ... [and] permit the
court to consider classified information as evidence
without risking the compromise of sensitive
intelligence sources and methods or foreign
government provided information. 2 '
While the government does have a high interest in national
security, the use of secret evidence is not vital to that interest. Secret
evidence may not be relevant to a national security interest or
reliable. For example, the government regularly "over-classifies
evidence."'' This phenomenon is revealed as secret documents
become unclassified. Much of this material fails to disclose
strategic data or vital sources. At any rate, much secret evidence is
not probative. Many declassified documents show a high degree of
racism among INS agents.' Moreover, "[m]ost of the material
turns out to be garbage-rumor, innuendo, [and] newspaper
clippings."'2 Not surprisingly, sixty-five percent of security and
terrorism cases were dismissed between 1992 and 1996 because the
evidence was weak or otherwise legally flawed.
124
Furthermore, the national security interest is more concerned
with the source of the information rather than with the information
itself. Secret evidence, nevertheless, disallows aliens and their
120 International Terrorism, 1995: Hearing on H.R. 896 Before the House
Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of William 0.
Studeman, Acting Director Central Intelligence).
121 DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 13, at 130.




counsel from viewing any of the substantive evidence. An alien's
right to view the evidence against him might be accomplished in
other ways without interfering with the ability to respond. For
example, the substance of evidence could be revealed after redacting
sources and methodology. Admittedly, aliens attempting to
impeach this evidence would not be able to question the reliability
of the information. Nevertheless, courts should counteract this
problem by taking an active role in making determinations of the
reliability of evidence.
The government clearly has an interest in national security.
However, secret evidence often does not implicate national security.
Furthermore, the private interests of aliens facing deportation is
very high and the risks imposed by using secret evidence are great.
Thus, these interests outweigh the government's interest in using
secret evidence. Therefore, resident aliens have a due process right
not to be subjected to secret evidence in immigration proceedings.
C. Secret Evidence Violates Confrontation Rights
In addition to violating due process rights, the INS's use of
secret evidence violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Using secret evidence violates aliens' confrontation
rights for several reasons. First, confrontation rights extend to an
accused facing government punishment. Immigration procedures
can result in the punishment of detention and deportation. Second,
using secret evidence violates the basic confrontation rights that are
presently extended to aliens.
Secret evidence procedures do not comport with these
rights. '2 For one, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in
administrative immigration proceedings. 26 Moreover, the INA is
125 Despite the INS regulations to the contrary, the Administrative
Procedure Act prohibits the use of ex parte evidence "relevant to the merits of the
proceeding." 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)(1994) and § 557(c)(1994). The APA also
prohibits ex parte communication if the administrative proceeding is an
adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994).
126 See Pub. L. No. 104-132,401, 8 U.S.C. 1534(h) (1999); Cunanan v. INS,
856 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9t1h Cir. 1988); Felzcerek v. INS F.3d 112, 116 (2 nd Cir.
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statutorily authorized to use unlawfully obtained evidence by
government." 7 Aliens facing deportation may not be allowed to
view the evidence before them, let alone to confront their
accusers."'2 These practices are purportedly justified under the
doctrine of United States v. Reynolds."9 In Reynolds, the Court
allowed for the protection of classified information that was
submitted at trial. 3 Nevertheless, the Court also stated that it is
"the firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the merits
of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions."''
Furthermore, the Court stated that privileges have no place in the
criminal context because "the Government which prosecutes an
accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is
unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke
its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything
which might be material to his defense."'32 While recognizing the
dangers of secret evidence in the criminal trial, the Reynolds Court
was unwilling to extend the Confrontation Clause protections to
aliens because it did not consider immigration procedures to be
criminal procedures.'33
The Sixth Amendment states that, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations; to be confronted with the witnesses against him." "'
Since they lack any punitive character, it is argued, immigration
1996).
127 See U.S.C. 1534 (e)(1)(b)(1996) ("An alien subject to removal under this
subchapter shall not be entitled to suppress evidence that the alien alleges was
unlawfully obtained[.]").
128 See U.S.C. § 1534 (e)(1)(a)(1996).
129 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
130 See id. (holding that the Secretary of the Air Force may assert a privilege
protecting military secrets).
131 Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aft'd, 484
U.S. 1 (1987).
132 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12.
133 See id.
134 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, §1.
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matters should not be considered "criminal prosecutions," and the
confrontation right does not apply. The Court recently declared that
since "deportation is not a criminal proceeding and has never been
held to be punishment ... no judicial review is guaranteed by the
Constitution."'135 Moreover, the INA recognizes that deportation is
not technically a criminal proceeding.
136
Confrontation rights should be extended to aliens because
immigration procedures result in government punishment. 37 Aliens
risk punishment sufficiently as grave as the punishment a criminal
receives. 3 The government punishes aliens in two ways: detention
and deportation.
First, aliens are punished by detention. Aliens facing
immigration charges are imprisoned. These aliens lose their liberty
135 Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952)) (upholding retroactive portions of the AEDPA
that eliminate the Federal Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review an alien's final
deportation order). See also, Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352, 355 (1 lth Cir.
1997) ("no judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution.").
136 See GORDON, supra note 36, at § 104.01.
137 See Gregory C. Clark, (D)evolution of Recent British and American
Antiterrorist Legislation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 270 (1999).
138 See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text. In Reno v. AADC, 525
U.S. 471, 497-98 (1999), Justice Ginsburg stated that:
Deportation, in any event, is a grave sanction. As this Court
has long recognized, 'that deportation is a penalty-at times a
most serious one-cannot be doubted[.]' Deportation places
'the liberty of an individual . .. at stake . . . .Though
deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a
great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right
to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.'
525 U.S. 471, 490 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 154 (1945). Similarly, Justice Souter argued that a constitutional
protection applies "to the like degree in immigration litigation, and is not
attenuated because the deportation is not a penalty for a criminal act [.]" Id. at
511. (Souter, J. dissenting). But see, id. at 491. (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("While
the consequences of deportation may be assuredly be grave, they are not
imposed as a punishment.").
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just as if they had been charged with a penal violation. Moreover,
aliens are often subjected to some of the worst prison conditions in
the country. Due to overcrowded facilities, detainees are often
shipped to remote abandoned prisons where they are far from their
communities and family, and "have little access to legal counsel,
translators, or immigration information." '139 Furthermore, aliens
may be detained for a much longer time than required by most
criminal punishments. 4 0
Second, aliens are punished by deportation. Deportation has
been characterized as a penalty: "a forfeiture for misconduct of the
privilege of residing in this country.''. In fact, the consequences of
deportation may be worse than many criminal punishments since
deportation is sometimes the equivalent of banishment or exile.'42
Exile has been considered a legal punishment since Roman times.'43
Along these lines, Justice Brandeis noted that deportation may
deprive a person of home, family, and "of all that makes life worth
living."'44 As one scholar described:
Deportation has a far harsher impact on most resident
aliens than many conceded 'punishments,'
Uprooting the alien from home, friends, family, and
work would be severe regardless of the country to
which the alien was being returned; breaking these
139 Jason H. Ehrenberg, Note, A Call for Reform of Recent Immigration
Legislation, U. MICH. J.L. REF. 195, 199 (1998).
140 See Sugg, supra note 12, at 2.
141 GORDON ETAL, supra note 36, at § 104.01[1]. See also, Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6 (1948).
142 GORDON ET AL, supra note 36, at § 104.01[1]. See also, Barber v.
Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (1954).
143 Exile existed as a formal punishment in Rome beginning in 63 B.C.
when Cicero sponsored a law against bribery punishable by ten years of exile. See
Michael C. Alexander, Ancient Law and Custom: The Western Legal Tradition:
Compensation in Roman Criminal Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 521 (1984).
I"4 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
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attachments inflicts more pain than preventing them
from being made. 4 '
Plainly, deportation is punishment. Thus, immigration proceedings
are properly characterized as criminal proceedings. Aliens,
therefore, should be afforded the confrontation fights set forth in
Reynolds. These rights prohibit basing the merits of a decision on
secret evidence.
Using secret evidence also violates the basic confrontation
rights that are presently extended to aliens. Immigration cases have
established certain confrontation rights for aliens based on common
law. For example, hidden evidence was disallowed because it
violated the fundamental right to a fair trial.'46 The Court in Bridges
v. Wixon, held that an alien had a due process right to confront his
accusers, 147 and that for ex parte communications, "[m]eticulous
care must be exercised lest the procedure... not meet the essential
standards of fairness."'
148
Courts have also established an aliens right to cross-examine. 49
When exparte evidence has been allowed, courts have applied strict
controls on its admissibility. For example, some courts have held
hearsay admissible only if it is both probative and "fundamentally
fair." 5 0  Other courts have admitted hearsay only "when the
145 G. NEUMAN, STRANGER TO CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 162 (1996).
146 See Gregory C. Clark, History Repeating Itself- the (D)evolution of
Recent British and American Antiterrorist Legislation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
247 (1999).
147 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 150-54 (1945) (holdifig that detention
based on unreliable hearsay evidence violates the right to confront one's
accusers).
148 Id. at 154.
149 See Cunnanan v. INS, 856 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Olabanji v.
INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5' Cir. 1992); Saidane v. INS, 129 F.3d 1063, 1065
(9"' Cir. 1997).
150 See Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 115 (2nd Cir. 1996). See also, Baliza
v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1997); Cunnanan v. INS, 856 F.2d 1373,
1374 (9th Cir. 1988); Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1234 (5" Cir. 1992).
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government demonstrates repeated, diligent, but unsuccessful
attempts to locate its witnesses,"'' or at the minimum requires that
the government submit a sworn statement by a witness who can
address the reliability of the evidence.'52 Along these lines, some
judges have insisted that the evidence be trustworthy and reliable.'53
The INS's use of secret evidence violates these
confrontation rights. First, aliens are often disallowed from
knowing who has submitted evidence to the government. Second,
aliens are not able to cross-examine secret evidence statements.
These statements are made out of court and the declarants are not
required to substantiate their statements in court. Third, secret
evidence often contains multiple hearsay. This hearsay evidence is
often admitted without any government effort to bring the declarants
to court. In contrast, the government often goes to great lengths to
keep those declarants from testifying. Fourth, secret evidence
usually contains unsworn statements, and the government does not
provide witnesses who can substantiate the reliability of those
statements. Finally, secret evidence has proven very untrustworthy
and unreliable. For these reasons, secret evidence precludes the
confrontation right protections already afforded to aliens.
Regardless, detention and deportation constitute
punishment. Therefore, immigration proceedings should be
considered criminal proceedings. Thus, secret evidence may not be
used to judge the merits of an immigration proceeding. For these
reasons, the INS's use of secret evidence violates the protections
granted by the Confrontation Clause.
1.51 Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409, 415 (1999) (disapproving
of Board of Immigration Appeals reliance on unswom, out of court statements of
an alien's ex-wife). See also, Dallo v. INS, 765 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1985)
(upholding INS use of an affidavit of an alien's ex-wife who was subpoenaed
three times, attempts made to locate with a private investigator, and the judge
telephoned her house).
152 See Kiareldeen at 409, 415.
1.53 Felzcerek, 75 F.3d at 114.
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V. CONCLUSION
The INS's use of secret evidence is unconstitutional in two
ways. First, secret evidence violates aliens' rights to due process.
Using secret evidence provides inadequate procedure for aliens who
wish to protect their important interests. These interests outweigh
the government's interest in national security. Second, the use of
secret evidence violates alien rights under the Confrontation Clause
because aliens are subject to government punishment. Furthermore,
common law establishes that secret evidence may not be used
against aliens in immigration proceedings.
In spite of being unconstitutional, the future of secret
evidence is unclear. Some have argued that the doctrine is
"crumbling."'54 Now that some courts have had the courage to order
the release of aliens, more courts will follow their lead. This new
trend is perhaps based on the realization that the fear that "these
really could be terrorists," is unfounded. 5 Others have argued that
the government will fight hard to continue using secret evidence.'5 6
With the "whole anti-terrorism mechanism resting on this process"
the government is not likely to give it up without a fight.' By
eliminating the secret evidence practice, it would be harder for the
government to use foreign intelligence sources in general, and will
make it more difficult to use political affiliation in prosecutions.'58
Along these lines, the INS states that the issue of secret
evidence is "far from being over."'59 The INS believes that using
secret evidence is a good policy, a "tool available to use," and will
154 Telephone Interview with Kamal Nawash, Legal Director,
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (Nov. 22, 1999).
155 Id.
156 See Letter from Kit Gage, National Coordinator, National Coalition to




159 Telephone Interview with Bill Strausberger, Public Affairs Officer,
Immigration and Naturalization Service (Nov. 22, 1999).
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continue to use it so long as it is allowed. 60 While the INS argues
that there are some "terrorist dangers," it acknowledges that serious
constitutional issues still need to be answered.' 6' The INS is aware
of the loud opposition voiced by community organizations, local
groups, and human rights organizations. Furthermore, the INS
recognizes that the use of secret evidence must be "very carefully
weighed," and purports that the INS is "doing it for the right
reasons."' 62 Accordingly, the INS would like more discretion in its
policymaking, but has lost much of its latitude with the passage of
AEDPA and IIRAIRA. The INS concedes that secret evidence is
the law and that it is required to use it. In essence, the INS feels
constrained by the will of Congress that it continue to use secret
evidence. 
63
In response, several United States Representatives have
sponsored House Bill 2121, the Secret Evidence Repeal Act of
1999.' 64 This Bill is designed "[tio ensure that no alien is removed,
denied a benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act, or
otherwise deprived of liberty, based on evidence that is kept secret
from the alien."' 161 So far the Bill has 64 co-sponsors. 166 The
viability of the Bill has improved due to the critical media coverage
following the recent decisions involving Kiareldeen and Ahmed.
167
In February of 2000, the House Immigration Subcommittee held







164 Authored by David Bonior (D-MI) and Tom Campbell (R-CA).
165 H.R. 2121, 106th Cong. (1999).
166 See Letter from Kit Gage, National Coordinator, National Coalition to
Protect Political Freedom, to D. Mark Jackson (Nov. 23, 1999) (on file with
author). Of the sponsors, 54 are democrats and 10 are republicans.
167 Id.
16H Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 2121 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 106th
Cong. 81 (2000). The Department of Justice and the FBI opposed the Bill.
Counsel from the FBI and INS argued that secret evidence was necessary because
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This is a responsible step by Congress. First, where the
judiciary has been slow in striking down an unconstitutional law,
Congress should seek to eliminate that law. The political branches
have a duty not to enact and enforce legislation that violates the
fundamental guarantees of the Constitution.'69 As the Country's
policymaker, Congress should eliminate a policy that has had
devastating results. Second, the INS relies heavily on Congress to
establish its procedures. By changing the law, Congress can provide
the legal and political leadership to allow the INS to discontinue the
use of secret evidence.
Nevertheless, disallowing the use of secret evidence may be
difficult. The INS claims to rely on a power to use secret evidence
that exists beyond its statute. Therefore, it remains to be seen
whether the INS would actually discontinue its use of secret
evidence in response to an act revoking its statutory authority. Such
unaccountability may be a casualty of the administrative state.
However, Congress should use its oversight powers to hold the INS
accountable to its intent. A move in this direction might be
indicated by the House Immigration Subcommittee, which has
launched new oversight hearings in order to more closely monitor
the INS .17
One human rights lawyer believes that secret evidence is a
problem that must be solved domestically. 17' Nevertheless, the
of a high national security interest in these cases. Further, they argued, the limited
rights afforded to aliens do not preclude the use of this procedure in immigration
cases, though this procedure would be unconstitutional if used in criminal cases
involving U.S. citizens. In response to a barrage of suspicious questions by many
of the committee members, the Department refused to comment on any specific
case. On the other hand, Professor David Cole presented forceful testimony in
favor of the legislation, citing both the Ahmed and Kiareldeen cases. Support for
the Bill was split mostly down partisan lines, with the republican chairman of the
committee, Lamar Smith (R-TX), arguing strongly against its adoption.
169 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 350 (1994)
(arguing that "non-judicial actors-Congress, the President, state officials, ordinary
citizens-to engage in deliberation about the meaning of the Constitution's broad
guarantees.").
170 See Wolchok, supra note 48, at 13.
171 Telephone Interview with Kamal Nawash, Legal Director, American-
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United States has come under international scrutiny for its use of
secret evidence. Some scholars have attacked many of these
provisions as violations of international law.' Aside from specific
treaty obligations, the United States may be in violation of its
international obligations if it fails to operate according to the
Constitution. The United States has incorporated the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Liberties and has declared that it
parallels the United States' obligations under the Constitution.
73
Thus, if the United States violates the Constitution, it
violates international law as well.'74 Therefore, opponents of secret
evidence should also utilize a variety of international mechanisms.
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, (Nov. 22, 1999).
172 Martin, supra note 35, at 685. See also, Ehrenberg, supra note 130, at
200-204 (arguing that several provisions of the immigration law violate
international law of which the United States is a party). See, e.g., Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223; Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, Art. 3.
173 See generally, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding
that international law is incorporated into the common law of the United States).
In a letter to Senator Pell, President George Bush stated that "'[t]he Covenant
codifies the essential freedoms people must enjoy in a democratic society[J'
With few exceptions, he added, 'it is entirely consonant with the fundamental
principles incorporated in our own Bill of Rights [.]'. RICHARD B. LILLICH &
HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
POLICY PRACTICE, 248 (3d ed. 1995) (citing Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 23, 102d.
Cong., 2d Sess., App. A at 25 (1992)). See also, Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 701, Reporters' Note 8 at 159-60
(1987) ("The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires states
parties to the Covenant to respect and ensure rights generally similar to those
protected by the United States Constitution.").
174 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires that
"anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for
his arrest and be promptly informed of any charges against him." Part III. Art. 9
§2. Furthermore, detainees have the right "[tjo be informed promptly and in
detail.., the nature and cause of the charge against him." Part III. Art. 14 §3(a),
and "[t]o be tried without undue delay." Part III. Art 14 §14(c). International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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First, opponents should voice their objections to the United
Nations. This year, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights met to review international progress on civil and political
rights. Several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) addressed
the Commission on current abuses of judicial standards. Amongst
the allegations cited were arbitrary arrests and secret detentions in
Algeria and Turkey. 75 Similarly, the Arab Organization for Human
Rights and North-South XXI condemned the detention of Lebanese
"hostages" held without trial in Israeli prisons.'76 Additionally,
Amnesty International has opposed the treatment of immigrants
who seek asylum in the United States.' 77 According to one human
rights organization, Amnesty International will include United
States' use of secret evidence in next year's annual report.'78
175 See United Nations Press Release, Non-Governmental Organizations
Decry Torture, Disappearances, Religious Intolerance, Problems with
Administration of Justice (April 9, 1999).
176 See id.
177 One report states:
Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum if they are
forced to flee their country to escape persecution. The USA
accepts this principle-it was one of the main architects of the
international system of refugee protection. Yet US authorities
violate the fundamental human rights of asylum-seekers[.]
They are often detained indefinitely on grounds beyond those
allowed by international standards ... are frequently denied
any opportunity of parole ... one official can keep a person
who has committed no crime in jail for months or years[.]
Amnesty International Report, United States of America: Lost in the Labyrinth:
Detention of Asylum-Seekers (Sept. 1999).
78 See Telephone Interview with Kamal Nawash, Legal Director for the
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, (Nov. 22, 1999). According to
one INS spokesperson, the Department of Justice is already aware of Amnesty
International's report and is planning a rebuttal to the allegations that the use of
secret evidence violates international human rights law. See Telephone Interview
with Bill Strausberger, Public Affairs Officer, Immigration and Naturalization
Service (Nov. 22, 1999).
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Reports by NGOs to the United Nations will make the
United States accountable to the world community. As many
nations seek higher human rights standards, the United States will
be compelled by international pressure to discontinue its secret
evidence policy. The United States may be persuaded by this
pressure for several reasons. First, the United States will need to
maintain a good reputation for human rights if it seeks to use its
military to enforce human rights abroad. Second, as the United
States continues to open up new trade markets, it will need the
cooperation of other nations. These nations may be less inclined to
support the proposals of a country which violates international
human rights standards. Third, the United States' negotiating power
may be damaged in specific regions. For example, the United States
may have difficulty maintaining the fragile diplomacy in Middle
East countries, as it continues to violate the rights of many of their
nationals who take residence in the United States.
Second, the United Nations should utilize its own
mechanisms. Entities of the United Nations such as the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, rapporteurs, and working groups
should further investigate and report on United States' policy. The
Commission already mandates several relevant entities, including
the Working Group on arbitrary detention, the Working Group on
racism and xenophobia,'79 and the Special Rapporteur on torture and
detention.' In addition, the Commission should consider a U.S.
specific rapporteur. Finally, NGOs should continue to work closely
with the High Commissioner for Human Rights to outline human
rights goals that will discourage the use of secret evidence. 181
Establishing these monitors will force the U.S. to vigorously defend
its record and to cooperate with an international investigation.
These groups should focus their attention on U.S. policy that
violates international recommendations. For example, the Working
179 See LILLICH & HANNUM, supra note 173, at 393.
180 See United Nations Press Release, Commission Report on the Question
of Torture and Detention (April 9, 1999).
191 See Amnesty International Report, United Nations Agenda for a New
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (April 1997).
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Group on arbitrary detention set forth criteria stating that
immigrants and asylum seekers should only be detained "as a last
available measure."' 8 2 The group added, "that detention should only
be for legitimate reasons; that detainees should be informed of the
reasons for detention[.]"' 83 The Special Rapporteur on religious
intolerance and the independence of judges and lawyers has stated
that improper detention without compensation may constitute a
"grave violation of human rights."' 84 These entities can apply
further pressure on the U.S. by calling attention to its violations of
international human rights standards.
International measures, however, should be utilized in
tandem with continued constitutional challenges in United States
domestic courts. Indeed, interpreting the Constitution to give the
same human rights to aliens within its borders as it does to its
citizens, accords with the goals of international human rights law.
Assuming that individual rights were contingent on the power of the
state reflects an antiquated positivist jurisprudence.'85 Human rights
law, in contrast,
recognizes that certain rights attach to the individual, and exist
independent of states. Providing constitutional protection to aliens
bolsters this recognition of universal human dignity.
Moreover, using secret evidence under the rationale of
national security is ultimately self-defeating. First, overreaching
national security policies make nations unsafe. Denying individuals
a proper hearing means that innocent people are more likely to be
punished, and guilty people are more likely to go free. Second,
marginalizing groups on the basis of their associations, ethnicities,
and nationalities creates discontent and distrust in government.
Eventually, this leads to a less stable nation. Finally, ostracizing
182 United Nations Press Release, Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention (April 9, 1999).
183 Id.
184 United Nations Press Release, Special Rapporteurs on Religious
Intolerance and Judicial Independence, Independent Expert on Compensation
Addresses Human Rights Commission (April 12, 1999).
185 See TRIBE, supra note 32, at 278.
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certain groups may provoke the very "anti-American" sentiments of
which some are fearful. Ironically, this may unnecessarily incite the
action of real terrorists.
Freedom is also an end in itself. Losing freedom means
losing a value that this Country holds as fundamental. In short, if
freedom must be sacrificed in order to achieve security, then there
may be little left that is worth keeping secure.
